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Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 
 
Nick Coons; U.S. Representatives Jeff   ) 
Flake; Trent Franks; and John Shadegg;   ) 
Speaker of the Arizona House of     )  Civil Action No. ______________ 
Representatives Kirk Adams; Arizona   ) 
Senators Carolyn Allen; Sylvia Allen; Ron ) 
Gould; Chuck Gray; Linda Gray; Jack   ) 
Harper; and John Nelson; Arizona    ) 
Representatives Cecil Ash; Nancy Barto;  ) 
Andrew Biggs; Judy Burges; Steve Court;  )  CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT 
David Gowan; Laurin Hendrix; Russell   )  FOR DECLARATORY AND 
Jones; John Kavanagh; Lucy Mason;    )  INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
Steve Montenegro; Rick Murphy;     ) 
Warde V. Nichols; Carl Seel; David    ) 
Stevens; Andrew Tobin; Janson T. Vogt;  ) 
James Weiers; Jerry Weiers; and Kimberly  ) 
Yee,              ) 
             ) 
        Plaintiffs,  ) 
v.             )  
             ) 
Timothy Geithner, in his official capacity as  ) 
Secretary of the United States Department  ) 
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of the Treasury; Kathleen Sebelius, in her  ) 
official capacity as Secretary of the United  ) 
States Department of Health and Human   ) 
Services; Eric Holder, Jr., in his official   ) 
capacity as Attorney General of the United  ) 
States; and Barack Hussein Obama, in his  ) 
official capacity as President of the    ) 
United States,          ) 
             ) 
        Defendants.  ) 
 
 Plaintiffs Nick Coons; U.S. Representatives Jeff Flake, Trent Franks and 
John Shadegg; Speaker of the Arizona House of Representatives Kirk Adams; 
Arizona Senators Carolyn Allen, Sylvia Allen, Ron Gould, Chuck Gray, Linda 
Gray, Jack Harper and John Nelson; Arizona Representatives Cecil Ash, Nancy 
Barto, Andrew Biggs, Judy Burges, Steve Court, David Gowan, Laurin Hendrix, 
Russell Jones, John Kavanagh, Debbie Lesko, Lucy Mason, Steve Montenegro, 
Rick Murphy, Warde V. Nichols, Carl Seel, David Stevens, Andrew Tobin, 
Janson T. Vogt, James Weiers, Jerry Weiers and Kimberly Yee (collectively 
“Plaintiffs”), by and through their undersigned counsel, bring this Complaint 
against the above-named Defendants, their employees, agents and successors in 
office.  In support of this Complaint, Plaintiffs allege the following upon 
information and belief: 
INTRODUCTION 
 1.  The federal government does not have the constitutional power to 
mandate that Plaintiff Nick Coons and other American citizens purchase health 
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insurance, much less surrender their medical privacy and autonomy, as a condition 
of living in the United States.  Further, it is a violation of the letter and spirit of the 
United States Constitution to burden the legislative voting powers of Arizona state 
legislators, including Plaintiffs Adams, C. Allen, S. Allen, Gould, C. Gray, L. 
Gray, Harper, Nelson; Ash, Barto, Biggs, Burges, Court, Gowan, Hendrix, Jones, 
Kavanagh, Lesko, Mason, Montenegro, Murphy, Nichols, Seel, Stevens, Tobin, 
Vogt, Ja. Weiers, Je. Weiers, and Yee (“State Legislator Plaintiffs”), to coerce 
implementation of federal health care regulations.  Moreover, Congress has no 
constitutional power to delegate nearly unlimited legislative power to any federal 
executive branch agency, much less to entrench health care regulations against 
review, debate, revision or repeal by Plaintiffs Jeff Flake, Trent Franks and John 
Shadegg or any other elected U.S. Representative or Senator.   
 Such federal overreaching must be rejected if the principles of limited 
government and the separation of powers established by the United States 
Constitution mean anything.   
 2.  Accordingly, Plaintiffs request a declaration by this Court that the 
federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“the Act”), H.R. 3590 
and H.R. 4872, both facially and as applied to them, violates the United States 
Constitution.   
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
 3. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1340 and 
1346(a)(2).   
 4. This Court is authorized to grant declaratory and injunctive relief under 
5 U.S.C. §§ 701 through 706, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 57 and 65, and by the general legal and equitable powers of the federal 
judiciary.  
 5. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(2). 
PARTIES 
 6. Plaintiff Nick Coons is a United States citizen and a citizen of Arizona, 
residing in the city of Tempe, within the jurisdiction of this Court.  Plaintiff Coons 
does not have private health insurance, objects to being compelled by the federal 
government through the passage of the Act to purchase health care coverage and 
objects to being compelled to share his private medical history with third parties. 
 7.  Plaintiff Jeff Flake is an elected United States Representative for 
Congressional District 6 of the State of Arizona.  Plaintiff Flake objects to 
Congress exceeding its constitutional powers and burdening his voting rights as a 
Representative by delegating nearly unlimited legislative power to a federal 
agency in the executive branch and attempting to entrench federal health care 
regulations from congressional review or repeal through the passage of the Act. 
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 8.  Plaintiff Trent Franks is an elected United States Representative for 
Congressional District 2 of the State of Arizona.  Plaintiff Franks objects to 
Congress exceeding its constitutional powers and burdening his voting rights as a 
representative by delegating nearly unlimited legislative power to a federal agency 
in the executive branch and attempting to entrench federal health care regulations 
from congressional review or repeal through the passage of the Act. 
 9.  Plaintiff John Shadegg is an elected United States Representative for 
Congressional District 3 of the State of Arizona.  Plaintiff Shadegg objects to 
Congress exceeding its constitutional powers and burdening his voting rights as a 
Representative by delegating nearly unlimited legislative power to a federal 
agency in the executive branch and attempting to entrench federal health care 
regulations from congressional review or repeal through the passage of the Act. 
 10.  Plaintiff Kirk Adams is the presiding officer of the Arizona House of 
Representatives and an elected Representative of the State of Arizona for 
Legislative District 19.  Plaintiff Adams objects to the federal government 
exceeding its constitutional powers and burdening his voting rights as a state 
legislator through the passage of the Act by using the threat of extreme economic 
duress to influence the passage or repeal of state appropriations. 
 11.  Plaintiff Carolyn Allen is an elected Senator of the State of Arizona for 
Legislative District 8.  Plaintiff Allen objects to the federal government exceeding 
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its constitutional powers and burdening her voting rights as a state legislator 
through the passage of the Act by using the threat of extreme economic duress to 
influence the passage or repeal of state appropriations. 
 12.  Plaintiff Sylvia Allen is an elected Senator of the State of Arizona for 
Legislative District 5.  Plaintiff Allen objects to the federal government exceeding 
its constitutional powers and burdening her voting rights as a state legislator 
through the passage of the Act by using the threat of extreme economic duress to 
influence the passage or repeal of state appropriations. 
 13.  Plaintiff Ron Gould is an elected Senator of the State of Arizona for 
Legislative District 3.  Plaintiff Gould objects to the federal government 
exceeding its constitutional powers and burdening his voting rights as a state 
legislator through the passage of the Act by using the threat of extreme economic 
duress to influence the passage or repeal of state appropriations. 
 14.  Plaintiff Chuck Gray is an elected Senator of the State of Arizona for 
Legislative District 19.  Plaintiff Gray objects to the federal government 
exceeding its constitutional powers and burdening his voting rights as a state 
legislator through the passage of the Act by using the threat of extreme economic 
duress to influence the passage or repeal of state appropriations. 
 15.  Plaintiff Linda Gray is an elected Senator of the State of Arizona for 
Legislative District 10.  Plaintiff Gray objects to the federal government 
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exceeding its constitutional powers and burdening her voting rights as a state 
legislator through the passage of the Act by using the threat of extreme economic 
duress to influence the passage or repeal of state appropriations. 
 16.  Plaintiff Jack Harper is an elected Senator of the State of Arizona for 
Legislative District 4.  Plaintiff Harper objects to the federal government 
exceeding its constitutional powers and burdening his voting rights as a state 
legislator through the passage of the Act by using the threat of extreme economic 
duress to influence the passage or repeal of state appropriations. 
 17.  Plaintiff John Nelson is an elected Senator of the State of Arizona for 
Legislative District 12.  Plaintiff Nelson objects to the federal government 
exceeding its constitutional powers and burdening his voting rights as a state 
legislator through the passage of the Act by using the threat of extreme economic 
duress to influence the passage or repeal of state appropriations. 
 18.  Plaintiff Cecil Ash is an elected Representative of the State of Arizona 
for Legislative District 18.  Plaintiff Ash objects to the federal government 
exceeding its constitutional powers and burdening his voting rights as a state 
legislator through the passage of the Act by using the threat of extreme economic 
duress to influence the passage or repeal of state appropriations. 
 19.  Plaintiff Nancy Barto is an elected Representative of the State of 
Arizona for Legislative District 7.  Plaintiff Barto objects to the federal 
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government exceeding its constitutional powers and burdening her voting rights as 
a state legislator through the passage of the Act by using the threat of extreme 
economic duress to influence the passage or repeal of state appropriations. 
 20.  Plaintiff Andrew Biggs is an elected Representative of the State of 
Arizona for Legislative District 22.  Plaintiff Biggs objects to the federal 
government exceeding its constitutional powers and burdening his voting rights as 
a state legislator through the passage of the Act by using the threat of extreme 
economic duress to influence the passage or repeal of state appropriations. 
 21.  Plaintiff Judy Burges is an elected Representative of the State of 
Arizona for Legislative District 4.  Plaintiff Burges objects to the federal 
government exceeding its constitutional powers and burdening her voting rights as 
a state legislator through the passage of the Act by using the threat of extreme 
economic duress to influence the passage or repeal of state appropriations. 
 22.  Plaintiff Steve Court is an elected Representative of the State of 
Arizona for Legislative District 18.  Plaintiff Court objects to the federal 
government exceeding its constitutional powers and burdening his voting rights as 
a state legislator through the passage of the Act by using the threat of extreme 
economic duress to influence the passage or repeal of state appropriations. 
 23.  Plaintiff David Gowan is an elected Representative of the State of 
Arizona for Legislative District 30.  Plaintiff Gowan objects to the federal 
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government exceeding its constitutional powers and burdening his voting rights as 
a state legislator through the passage of the Act by using the threat of extreme 
economic duress to influence the passage or repeal of state appropriations. 
 24.  Plaintiff Laurin Hendrix is an elected Representative of the State of 
Arizona for Legislative District 22.  Plaintiff Hendrix objects to the federal 
government exceeding its constitutional powers and burdening his voting rights as 
a state legislator through the passage of the Act by using the threat of extreme 
economic duress to influence the passage or repeal of state appropriations. 
 25.  Plaintiff Russell Jones is an elected Representative of the State of 
Arizona for Legislative District 24.  Plaintiff Jones objects to the federal 
government exceeding its constitutional powers and burdening his voting rights as 
a state legislator through the passage of the Act by using the threat of extreme 
economic duress to influence the passage or repeal of state appropriations. 
 26.  Plaintiff John Kavanagh is an elected Representative of the State of 
Arizona for Legislative District 8.  Plaintiff Kavanagh objects to the federal 
government exceeding its constitutional powers and burdening his voting rights as 
a state legislator through the passage of the Act by using the threat of extreme 
economic duress to influence the passage or repeal of state appropriations. 
 27.  Plaintiff Debbie Lesko is an elected Representative of the State of 
Arizona for Legislative District 9.  Plaintiff Lesko objects to the federal 
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government exceeding its constitutional powers and burdening her voting rights as 
a state legislator through the passage of the Act by using the threat of extreme 
economic duress to influence the passage or repeal of state appropriations. 
 28.  Plaintiff Lucy Mason is an elected Representative of the State of 
Arizona for Legislative District 1.  Plaintiff Mason objects to the federal 
government exceeding its constitutional powers and burdening her voting rights as 
a state legislator through the passage of the Act by using the threat of extreme 
economic duress to influence the passage or repeal of state appropriations. 
 29.  Plaintiff Steve Montenegro is an elected Representative of the State of 
Arizona for Legislative District 12.  Plaintiff Montenegro objects to the federal 
government exceeding its constitutional powers and burdening his voting rights as 
a state legislator through the passage of the Act by using the threat of extreme 
economic duress to influence the passage or repeal of state appropriations. 
 30.  Plaintiff Rick Murphy is an elected Representative of the State of 
Arizona for Legislative District 9.  Plaintiff Murphy objects to the federal 
government exceeding its constitutional powers and burdening his voting rights as 
a state legislator through the passage of the Act by using the threat of extreme 
economic duress to influence the passage or repeal of state appropriations. 
 31.  Plaintiff Warde V. Nichols is an elected Representative of the State of 
Arizona for Legislative District 21.  Plaintiff Nichols objects to the federal 
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government exceeding its constitutional powers and burdening his voting rights as 
a state legislator through the passage of the Act by using the threat of extreme 
economic duress to influence the passage or repeal of state appropriations. 
 32.  Plaintiff Carl Seel is an elected Representative of the State of Arizona 
for Legislative District 6.  Plaintiff Seel objects to the federal government 
exceeding its constitutional powers and burdening his voting rights as a state 
legislator through the passage of the Act by using the threat of extreme economic 
duress to influence the passage or repeal of state appropriations. 
 33.  Plaintiff David Stevens is an elected Representative of the State of 
Arizona for Legislative District 25.  Plaintiff Stevens objects to the federal 
government exceeding its constitutional powers and burdening his voting rights as 
a state legislator through the passage of the Act by using the threat of extreme 
economic duress to influence the passage or repeal of state appropriations. 
 34.  Plaintiff Andrew Tobin is an elected Representative of the State of 
Arizona for Legislative District 1.  Plaintiff Tobin objects to the federal 
government exceeding its constitutional powers and burdening his voting rights as 
a state legislator through the passage of the Act by using the threat of extreme 
economic duress to influence the passage or repeal of state appropriations. 
 35.  Plaintiff Janson T. Vogt is an elected Representative of the State of 
Arizona for Legislative District 30.  Plaintiff Vogt objects to the federal 
 Page 12 of 78 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
12 
 
13 
 
14 
 
15 
 
16 
 
17 
 
18 
 
19 
 
20 
 
21 
 
22 
 
23 
 
24 
 
25 
 
26 
 
27 
 
28 
 
government exceeding its constitutional powers and burdening his voting rights as 
a state legislator through the passage of the Act by using the threat of extreme 
economic duress to influence the passage or repeal of state appropriations. 
 36.  Plaintiff James Weiers is an elected Representative of the State of 
Arizona for Legislative District 10.  Plaintiff Weiers objects to the federal 
government exceeding its constitutional powers and burdening his voting rights as 
a state legislator through the passage of the Act by using the threat of extreme 
economic duress to influence the passage or repeal of state appropriations. 
 37.  Plaintiff Jerry Weiers is an elected Representative of the State of 
Arizona for Legislative District 12.  Plaintiff Weiers objects to the federal 
government exceeding its constitutional powers and burdening his voting rights as 
a state legislator through the passage of the Act by using the threat of extreme 
economic duress to influence the passage or repeal of state appropriations. 
 38.  Plaintiff Kimberly Yee is an elected Representative of the State of 
Arizona for Legislative District 10.  Plaintiff Yee objects to the federal 
government exceeding its constitutional powers and burdening her voting rights as 
a state legislator through the passage of the Act by using the threat of extreme 
economic duress to influence the passage or repeal of state appropriations. 
 39.  Defendant Timothy Geithner is Secretary of the United States 
Department of the Treasury.  As Treasury Secretary, Defendant Geithner is head 
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of the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) and is responsible for enforcing the 
Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”), including overseeing the collection of taxes and 
certain penalties assessed by the Act.  Defendant Geithner is sued in his official 
capacity. 
 40.   Defendant Kathleen Sebelius is the Secretary of the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services.  As Secretary of the U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services, Defendant Sebelius is principally responsible for 
administering the Act.  Defendant Sebelius is sued in her official capacity. 
 41.  Defendant Eric Holder, Jr. is the Attorney General of the United States.  
As the Attorney General, Defendant Holder is the head of the Department of 
Justice and the chief law enforcement officer of the federal government.  
Accordingly, Defendant Holder is responsible for enforcing the civil and criminal 
laws of the United States, including the Act.  Defendant Holder is sued in his 
official capacity.   
 42.  Defendant Barack Obama is the President of the United States.  The 
Constitution‟s executive power is vested in the President.  As head of the 
Executive Branch, Defendant Obama is empowered to direct and enforce the laws 
of the United States, including the Act.  Defendant Obama is sued in his official 
capacity.  
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GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
The Act Forces Plaintiff Coons to Buy Insurance 
He Does Not Want or Need 
 
 43.  Plaintiff Coons does not maintain and has no intention of maintaining 
health insurance coverage for the foreseeable future and at least through 2020.  
Rather than maintaining health insurance, Mr. Coons has maintained a savings 
account since 2006, in which he sets aside savings for medical expenses and other 
unusual or extraordinary expenses to be paid out of pocket.   
 44.  Plaintiff Coons does not maintain insurance because he is healthy and 
has never been seriously ill.  At age 31, he believes he will not need insurance 
coverage for at least another ten years; thereafter, Mr. Coons only intends to 
purchase insurance providing catastrophic coverage with at least a $5000 
deductible. 
 45.  Plaintiff Coons has a greater incentive to maintain his health without 
insurance than he would have with insurance.  Mr. Coons believes that retaining 
freedom of choice over whether to purchase insurance helps him maintain his 
health and stay healthy. 
 46.  Because his household income is roughly $80,000 per year, Mr. Coons 
also believes that his resources, for at least the next ten years, are better spent on 
growing his small business than on medical insurance if he is to create the wealth 
he needs to enjoy his life to the fullest in his later years.  
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 47.  Plaintiff Coons is not: a) a religious conscientious objector to the Act; 
b) a member of a health care ministry; c) a member of an Indian Tribe; d) 
incarcerated; e) a veteran; or f) eligible for Medicaid or Medicare. 
 48.   By refusing to purchase health care coverage for the next ten years, 
Plaintiff Coons will be subject to penalties under the Act.   
 49.  Specifically, beginning in 2014, the Act will force private citizens, 
including Plaintiff Coons, to purchase health care coverage under penalty of 
federal law (the “individual mandate”).  H.B. 3590 § 1501(b) (I.R.C. § 5000A (a) 
and (b) (2010)).  
 50.  The Act forces Plaintiff Coons to purchase insurance with specified 
“minimum essential coverage,” H.B. 3590 § 1501(b) (I.R.C. § 5000A (a) and (f) 
(2010)), which exceeds coverage that Coons believes he may need and requires 
him to pay for services he may never use.  
 51.  Plaintiff Coons does not qualify for any exemption or waiver of the 
individual mandate. 
 52.  If a private citizen such as Plaintiff Coons chooses not to purchase an 
acceptable or minimum essential level of health care coverage, as determined by 
the federal government, monetary penalties will be imposed by Defendants under 
the Act (hereinafter the “individual mandate penalty”).  H.B. 3590 § 1501(b) 
(I.R.C. § 5000A(b) (2010)).   
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 53.  The amount of the individual mandate penalty is either the sum of 
“monthly penalty amounts” or a flat rate equal to the amount of “the national 
average premium for qualified health plans which have a bronze level of 
coverage,” whichever is less.  H.B. 3590 § 1501(b) (I.R.C. § 5000A(c)(1) (2010)).   
 54.   The individual mandate‟s “monthly penalty amounts” are the greater of 
a flat dollar amount or a percentage of income.  The “monthly penalty amounts” 
are imposed according to the following schedule:  $95 in 2014, $325 in 2015, and 
$695 in 2016 for the flat fee; or up to 1.0% of taxable income in 2014, 2.0% of 
taxable income in 2015, and 2.5% of taxable income in 2016.  H.B. 4872 § 1002 
(I.R.C. § 5000A(c)(2) (2010)).  After 2016, the penalty is subject to yearly cost of 
living adjustments.  H.B. 3590 § 1501(b) (I.R.C. § 5000A(c) (2) and (3) (2010)). 
 55.  Additionally, citizens such as Plaintiff Coons, are subject to separate 
penalties for failing to maintain acceptable coverage for their dependents.  H.B. 
3590 § 1501(b) (I.R.C. § 5000A (b) (1) and (3) (2010)). 
 56.  To ensure that he will have sufficient funds to pay the individual 
mandate penalty, Plaintiff Coons is currently forced to consider saving a 
significant portion of his income to pay the anticipated individual mandate 
penalties he will face beginning in 2014. 
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The Act Forces Plaintiff Coons to Surrender his Medical Privacy 
 57.  Beginning in 2014, the threat of the individual mandate‟s penalties will 
force Plaintiff Coons to disclose private medical information to health insurance 
issuers; applications for individual and small group health insurance from Arizona 
health plans and health insurance issuers (collectively “health insurance issuers”) 
have customarily required and will continue to require the disclosure of private 
and personal medical information by applicants. 
 58.  Additionally, health insurance issuers in Arizona customarily request 
that individual applicants for health insurance sign a general authorization for the 
disclosure of their medical information, history and records under the federal 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-191. 
 59.  The request for a general HIPAA disclosure authorization is 
customarily made by health insurance issuers even for small group insurance plan 
applicants, despite the fact that prospective insureds with preexisting conditions 
are not ordinarily excluded from small group health insurance coverage. 
 60.  Arizona health insurance issuers request such general HIPAA 
disclosure authorizations wholly apart from any possible decision to deny health 
insurance coverage for preexisting conditions because they need to assess their 
exposure for future medical claims from new applicants for rate-setting purposes. 
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 61.  The custom and practice of Arizona health insurance issuers requesting 
medical information and a general HIPAA disclosure authorization in connection 
with processing health insurance applications is likely to continue for the 
foreseeable future and certainly well beyond 2014. 
 62.  The general HIPAA disclosure authorization typically required of 
applicants for health insurance in Arizona allows health insurance issuers to 
disclose to third parties personal medical information, history and records of 
applicants for any legitimate business purpose, including marketing purposes, 
such as the disclosure of personal medical information and records to data-mining 
businesses.  See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.501, 164.508(a)(2), 508(a)(3). 
 63.  In fact, Arizona health insurance issuers and other insurers around the 
country routinely share the personal medical information of millions of insureds 
and insurance applicants with private organizations, such as the Medical 
Information Bureau (“MIB”), United Health Group-Ingenix and Milliman, which 
maintain searchable databases of personal medical information concerning past 
and present insureds and insurance applicants. 
 64.  About 600 insurance firms use the services of the MIB to obtain 
information about individual health insurance policy applicants.   
 65.  The Medpoint and Intelliscript databases maintained by Ingenix and 
Milliman include personalized prescription records for at least the preceding five 
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years.  See Chad Terhune, They Know What’s in Your Medicine Cabinet, 
BUSINESSWEEK, July 23, 2008, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_31/b4094000643943.htm?ch
an=magazine+channel_in+depth (last visited May 5, 2010). 
 66.  Even without a signed HIPAA disclosure authorization or the insurance 
applicant‟s consent, health insurance issuers are required under HIPAA to disclose 
personal medical information, history and records of health insurance applicants 
to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services when it undertakes a 
compliance investigation, compliance review or enforcement action.  45 C.F.R. § 
164.502(a)(2). 
 67.  Without the insurance applicant‟s consent, health insurance issuers are 
authorized under HIPAA to disclose personal medical information, history and 
records of health insurance applicants in any of the following circumstances, 
among others: 
a) For medical treatment, payment and health care operations, 45 C.F.R. § 
164.501, including disclosures for patient referrals, training programs for 
students and health care practitioners, collections and general administrative 
activities, 45 C.F.R. § 506(c), and; 
 
b) For general public interest purposes, including disclosures required by 
statute, regulation, administrative process or court order, disclosures 
requested by public health authorities or needed for government benefit 
administration, state and federal regulatory agencies, law enforcement 
agencies or academic researchers, to prevent threats to public health and 
safety, and to assure performance of essential governmental functions, such 
as the proper execution of a military mission or to conduct intelligence or 
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national security activities.  45 C.F.R. §§ 164.501, 502(j)(2), 504(f), 512, 
514(d), (e). 
 
 68.  In addition to the disclosures expressly required or authorized by law, 
HIPAA permits the incidental use or disclosure of personal medical information, 
history and records provided that “reasonable safeguards” are in place to prevent 
the occurrence from happening too often or too egregiously.  See 45 C.F.R. § 
164.530(c)(2). 
 69.  “Business associates” of health insurance issuers, such as collection 
agencies and data-storage, data-sharing or data-mining businesses, may make any 
disclosure that HIPAA authorizes the insurer to make.  45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e). 
 70.  With or without the consent of the insurance applicant or a HIPAA 
disclosure authorization, millions of entities, including health insurance issuers, 
underwriters, providers, self-insured employers, regulatory agencies, law 
enforcement, military and intelligence agencies, universities, disease registries, 
insurance brokers, pharmacy benefits managers, laboratories, hospitals, and their 
business associates, such as credit bureaus, law firms, pharmaceutical companies, 
accounting firms, offshore data warehouses and transcription services, and 
millions more employees of such entities, both full time and temporary, are 
authorized under HIPAA and Arizona law to access personal medical information, 
history and records that would be furnished by individuals, including Plaintiff 
Coons, obtained as part of the insurance application process. 
 Page 21 of 78 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
12 
 
13 
 
14 
 
15 
 
16 
 
17 
 
18 
 
19 
 
20 
 
21 
 
22 
 
23 
 
24 
 
25 
 
26 
 
27 
 
28 
 
 71.  HIPAA does not require audit trails for all uses and disclosures of 
personal medical information, history and records.  See 45 C.F.R. § 164.528(a)(1). 
 72.  HIPAA does not require data encryption for stored electronic medical 
information or records when the data is not being transmitted. 
 73.  HIPAA does not require at least two-factor authentication (password 
plus additional identification) for access to secure medical data systems. 
 74.  A 15 month study published by the eHealth Vulnerability Reporting 
Program in 2007 revealed that hackers could penetrate every medical data system 
maintained by 850 providers. 
 75.  Since the enactment of HIPAA, there have been numerous reported 
instances of confidential personal medical information, history and records being 
disclosed, including much publicized incidents in which UCLA hospital 
employees were repeatedly caught snooping in pop singer Britney Spears‟ files 
and actress Farrah Fawcett‟s cancer records.  Charles Ornstein, Fawcett’s cancer 
file breached, LOS ANGELES TIMES, April 3, 2008. 
 76.  Since April 2003, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(“HHS”) and affiliated federal agencies have received over 50,989 complaints that 
disclosures of medical information, history or records violated HIPAA.  Of the 
more than 45,000 complaints processed to date, at least 10,515 investigation and 
enforcement cases have been brought against health plans (group health plans and 
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health insurance issuers) and other entities governed by HIPAA.   The two most 
frequent complaints investigated by HHS are impermissible use and disclosure of 
protected health information and the lack of safeguards for protected health 
information. 
 77.  Arizona state law does not provide more protection for the privacy of 
personal medical information, history and records obtained as part of the 
insurance application process than does HIPAA. 
 78.  Arizona health insurance issuers are in full compliance with the 
medical information and records disclosure regulations of the Arizona Insurance 
Information and Privacy Protection Act when they comply with HIPAA.  ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-2122(A) (2010). 
 79.  Arizona health insurance issuers that disclose personal medical 
information, history and records in compliance with HIPAA are immune under 
state law from any liability for invasion of privacy unless they disclose or furnish 
false information with malice or willful intent to injure any person.  Compare 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-2119 (2010) with § 20-2122(A) (2010). 
 80.  Compelling citizens, such as Plaintiff Coons, to purchase insurance will 
require them as a matter of law and fact to share and/or risk sharing with millions 
of strangers who are not physicians confidential private and personal medical 
history information, which they do not wish to share, and to which they have a 
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legitimate and constitutionally protected claim of privacy in refusing to share.  See 
United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); cf. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters 
Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989) (“[B]oth the common 
law and the literal understandings of privacy encompass the individual‟s control 
of information concerning his or her person”). 
 81.  Plaintiff Coons objects to and fears the loss of privacy threatened by 
the Act‟s individual mandate. 
 82.  Plaintiff Coons‟ concerns about the loss of privacy from the individual 
mandate are reasonable because HIPAA and Arizona state law do not guarantee a 
reasonable degree of security in the confidentiality of private and personal 
medical information, history and records disclosed to and authorized to be 
disclosed to health insurance issuers as part of the health insurance application 
process.  
 83.  Plaintiff Coons‟ reasonable concerns about the loss of medical privacy 
threatened by the individual mandate are currently chilling and will continue to 
chill his willingness to freely and openly communicate with health care 
professionals about personal medical matters and thereby prevent the openness 
and intimacy required by an effective doctor-patient relationship, which threatens 
to undermine the quality of his health care. 
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The Act Burdens the Legislative Powers of 
Plaintiffs Flake, Franks and Shadegg 
 
 84.  The Act creates the Independent Payment Advisory Board (“IPAB”), 
which is to comprise of 15 voting members appointed by the President with the 
advice and consent of the Senate; the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the 
Administrator of the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services, and the 
Administrator of the Health Resources and Services Administration, “serve ex 
officio as nonvoting members of the Board.”  H.B. 3590 (as modified by H.B. 
4872) § 3403 (42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(g)(1)(A) (i) and (ii) (2010)). 
 85.  Beginning in 2014, the Act requires IPAB to make “detailed and 
specific proposals related to the Medicare program.”  H.B. 3590 (as modified by 
H.B. 4872) § 3403 (42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(c)(1)(A) (2010)). 
 86.  The Act also requires IPAB to make “recommendations” that “will 
cause a net reduction in total Medicare program spending in the implementation 
year that is at least equal to the applicable savings target.”  H.B. 3590 (as modified 
by H.B. 4872) § 3403 (42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(c)(2)(A)(i) (2010)). 
 87.  IPAB‟s regulatory proposal and recommendation powers under the Act 
are not merely advisory; they become law and must be implemented by the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services if Congress does not act to amend them 
by August 15th of each successive session.  H.B. 3590 (as modified by H.B. 4872) 
§ 3403 (42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(e)(1) (2010)). 
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 88.  The Act anticipates and authorizes IPAB to propose and recommend 
regulations for private health care markets and non-federal health care delivery 
systems because IPAB has a statutory obligation to “coordinate” its proposals and 
recommendations with studies of private health care markets and non-federal 
health care delivery systems.  H.B. 3590 (as modified by H.B. 4872) § 3403 (42 
U.S.C. § 1395kkk (c)(2)(B), (n), (o)(1) and (2) (2010)). 
89.  Because IPAB is prohibited from directly rationing health care, 
increasing Medicare beneficiary cost sharing, restricting Medicare benefits and 
modifying Medicare eligibility criteria to meet its Medicare spending reduction 
target, see H.B. 3590 (as modified by H.B. 4872) § 3403 (42 U.S.C. § 
1395kkk(c)(2)(A) (2010)), IPAB will inevitably propose and recommend: a) 
reductions in Medicare payments under parts C and D; b) reduced reimbursement 
rates to health care providers furnishing services to Medicare beneficiaries;  c) 
restructured reimbursement rates based on a “capitated model,” under which a set 
amount unrelated to actual supply and demand for services will be paid per illness 
or injury; d) price controls and/or pricing mandates and similar regulations for 
private health care markets and non-federal health care delivery systems; and/or e) 
reductions in appropriations for Medicare program spending or other programs 
which would otherwise increase Medicare program spending. 
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90.  When any of IPAB‟s foregoing proposals or recommendations become 
law, or if they are anticipated by health care providers to become law, health care 
providers will withdraw from participating in Medicare and reduce the availability 
of health care services to a greater extent than would otherwise be the case. 
 91.  Reasonable expectations of any of IPAB‟s foregoing proposals or 
recommendations becoming law: a) discourages entry by individuals into the 
health care professions; b) discourages investment and innovation in health care 
industries; c) reduces the supply of health care providers willing to furnish health 
services in private health care markets and in non-federal health care delivery 
systems; d) increases demand for health care services by consumers in private 
health care markets and in non-federal health care delivery systems in the interim 
before such regulations become effective; and e) causes higher prices for health 
care services in private health care markets and in non-federal health care delivery 
systems in the interim before such regulations become effective.  
 92.  According to economist and former U.S. Department of Labor 
Secretary Robert Reich, it is reasonable to expect that health reforms such as those 
entrusted to IPAB‟s regulatory authority: a) “means you–particularly you young 
people–particularly you young healthy people–you‟re going to have to pay more”; 
b) “if you‟re very old–we‟re not going to give you all that technology and all 
those drugs for the last couple of years of your life to keep you maybe going for 
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another couple of months.  It‟s too expensive.  So we‟re going to let you die”; and 
c) “drug companies and insurance companies and medical suppliers [will be 
forced] to reduce their costs . . . [which] means less innovation and that means less 
new products and less new drugs on the market which means you are probably not 
going to live that much longer than your parents.”  Audio recording: Robert 
Reich‟s lecture to Professor Alan Ross‟ political science class at the University of 
California, Berkeley (September 9, 2007), 
http://webcast.berkeley.edu/stream.php?type=download&webcastid=20057 (last 
visited August 2, 2010). 
 93.  The Act entrenches numerous limitations on each House‟s 
parliamentary rules to burden and limit the ability of Representatives and Senators 
to review, debate, modify or reject the IPAB‟s proposals and recommendations 
before they automatically become law and must be implemented by the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services. 
 94.  The Act‟s entrenched limitations on parliamentary rules for future 
Congresses considering IPAB‟s proposals and recommendations include, but are 
not limited to, the following:  
A) Upon receipt of IPAB‟s legislative proposal, the majority leader of the 
House and Senate must introduce the legislation and, if no introduction is 
made within five days after receipt, any member of the House or Senate 
may introduce the legislation, whereupon IPAB‟s legislative proposal must 
be referred “by the Presiding Officers of the respective Houses to the 
Committee on Finance in the Senate and to the Committee on Energy and 
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Commerce and the Committee on Ways and Means in the House of 
Representatives.”  H.B. 3590 (as modified by H.B. 4872) § 3403 (42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395kkk(d)(1) (2010)). 
 
B) If IPAB‟s legislative proposal is not acted upon on or before April 1st of 
the respective session, by the Committee on Finance in the Senate and to 
the Committee on Energy and Commerce and the Committee on Ways and 
Means, then the Committee‟s consideration of the same is required to be 
terminated.  H.B. 3590 (as modified by H.B. 4872) § 3403 (42 U.S.C. § 
1395kkk(d)(2) (2010)). 
 
C) If any action is taken on IPAB‟s legislative proposal, the Act requires the 
House and Senate to enforce parliamentary rules precluding any 
modification of IPAB‟s proposed legislation that increases total Medicare 
program spending or that fails to cause “a net reduction in total Medicare 
program spending in the implementation year that is at least equal to the 
applicable savings target.”  H.B. 3590 (as modified by H.B. 4872) § 3403 
(42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(d)(3)(B) (2010)). 
 
D) The Act requires the Senate to enforce parliamentary rules precluding 
more than 30 hours of debate on IPAB‟s legislative proposal, precluding 
more than 10 hours of debate after IPAB‟s legislative proposal returns from 
conference committee, and precluding more than 1 hour of debate after any 
veto by the President.  H.B. 3590 (as modified by H.B. 4872) § 3403 (42 
U.S.C. § 1395kkk(d)(4) (B) through (F) (2010)). 
 
E) The Act entrenches the foregoing parliamentary rules by declaring they 
supersede contrary rules, expressly prohibiting their repeal, and by 
requiring a three-fifths vote of all of the members of the respective House to 
waive them.  H.B. 3590 (as modified by H.B. 4872) § 3403 (42 U.S.C. § 
1395kkk(d)(3 )(C), (D), (E) (2010)). 
 
 95.  The Act further entrenches the delegation of legislative powers to IPAB 
and insulates IPAB from congressional review by prohibiting Congress from 
repealing IPAB‟s statutory enabling authority except through a specifically 
worded “Joint Resolution,” which may be proposed only during the year of 2017, 
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before February 1st, and passed only upon a three-fifths vote of all members of 
each House.  H.B. 3590 (as modified by H.B. 4872) § 3403 (42 U.S.C. § 
1395kkk(f) (2010)).   
 96.  In effect, in 2017 Plaintiffs Flake, Franks and Shadegg and other 
federal legislators only have at or about 14 business days to propose such a “Joint 
Resolution” repealing IPAB‟s statutory enabling authority or the Act forever 
forecloses them from doing so.  
 97.  The Act thus burdens and/or purports to deny members of Congress, 
including Plaintiffs Representatives Flake, Franks and Shadegg of their legislative 
power and right to consider, review, debate and vote on the legislative proposals 
of IPAB like any other legislative proposal and to repeal IPAB like any other 
administrative agency that is legislatively established. 
 98.  Representatives Flake, Franks and Shadegg and other federal legislators 
will propose legislation, as part of the normal course of their legislative rights and 
duties, to repeal the IPAB provisions of the Act.  Plaintiffs Flake, Franks and 
Shadegg are discouraged from proposing such legislation now and in the future 
because of the express provisions of the Act that unlawfully change rulemaking in 
Congress and prohibit Congress from considering any bill, resolution, amendment 
or conference report that would repeal IPAB, between January 1, 2017 and 
January 31, 2017, and only if passed upon a three-fifths vote of all members of 
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each House.  H.B. 3590 (as modified by H.B. 4872) § 3403 (42 U.S.C. § 
1395kkk(f) (2010)). 
The Act Burdens the Quasi-Sovereign Legislative Powers  
of State Legislator Plaintiffs 
 
 99.  The Arizona Legislature has plenary authority over appropriations.  
The Arizona Legislature‟s plenary authority is not limited by enumerated 
constitutional objectives.  
 100.  The State of Arizona–unlike Congress–has inherent police powers.  
 101.  In 1998, the attorneys general of 46 states, including Arizona, agreed 
to settle a lawsuit they filed against the manufacturers of tobacco products.  As a 
result, the tobacco manufacturers must pay each of those states a portion of the 
estimated $206 billion settlement each year over the next 25 years.  Arizona 
voters, through ballot initiative Proposition 204, generously decided to use the 
tobacco settlement funds to expand eligibility for the Arizona Health Care Cost 
Containment System (“AHCCCS”), the State‟s health care system for the poor.  
Before Proposition 204, for a person to receive health care insurance under 
AHCCCS, the recipient‟s net income could not exceed approximately 34% of the 
federal poverty level.  Proposition 204 expanded eligibility to people who earn up 
to 100% of the federal poverty level. 
 102.  The amount Arizona must contribute towards sustaining Proposition 
204‟s eligibility requirement has steadily increased each year since 2002.  As a 
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result, the tobacco settlement funds have proven insufficient to sustain Proposition 
204‟s expanded eligibility.  In fiscal year 2010 alone, Proposition 204 AHCCCS 
eligibility costs are $635.2 million.  Of that amount, the tobacco settlement 
revenue contributes $108.2 million, while the State‟s general fund contributes 
$460.7 million and other state funds contribute the remaining $66.3 million 
needed to keep AHCCCS out of the red.   
 103.  Despite the fact that Arizona is already among a handful of the most 
generous states in funding access to government funded medical care, and is 
increasingly unable to afford such generosity, the Act now requires that Arizona 
vastly broaden its Medicaid eligibility standards from 100% of the federal poverty 
level to 133% and correspondingly increases Arizona‟s maintenance of effort 
requirements. 
 104.  The Act‟s individual mandate combined with its increased Medicaid 
eligibility and maintenance of effort requirements will inevitably cause many 
more individuals to enroll in Medicaid than would have otherwise enrolled, as a 
result of the “woodwork effect.”  The Act will thereby cause the State of Arizona 
to face a legion of new Medicaid enrollees, for whom Arizona does not have the 
ability to fund related health care costs.   
 105.  The Act‟s increased Medicaid eligibility and maintenance of effort 
requirements in effect punish Arizona and its citizens for their initial generosity 
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under Proposition 204 by coercing the state into continuing to cover individuals 
well beyond the baseline required for federal Medicaid matching funds in other 
states.  This is a cost Arizona, which is experiencing a financial crisis, cannot 
afford. 
 106.   Arizona‟s Joint Legislative Budget Committee estimates that the 
Act‟s increased Medicaid eligibility and maintenance of effort requirements will 
cost Arizona between $7,466,973,000 and $11.6 billion through 2020.  
 107.  The Act‟s onerous financial burden on the State occurs at a time when 
Arizona must already make severe budget cuts, in excess of $2.3 billion through 
2020, to offset revenue shortfalls because the Arizona Constitution (unlike its 
federal counterpart) requires the state budget to be balanced each fiscal year.  
ARIZ. CONST., art. 9, §§ 3, 5.   
 108.  If Arizona refuses to comply with the Act‟s new Medicaid eligibility 
and maintenance of effort requirements, Arizona will reportedly lose federal 
matching funds, including all Title 11 and Title 19 funding, in the amount of at 
least $7.65 billion each fiscal year beginning 2011, vastly deepening the revenue 
shortfall preventing the state budget from being balanced and necessitating 
wholesale lay-offs of state employees and suspension of substantially all state 
governmental services.   
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 109.  The threat of losing federal matching funds for noncompliance with 
the Act‟s eligibility and maintenance of effort requirements forced a “Hobson‟s 
choice” on Arizona legislators, including State Legislator Plaintiffs. 
 110.  The threat of losing federal matching funds, including all Title 11 and 
Title 19 funding, during fiscal year 2010-11 for noncompliance with the Act‟s 
eligibility and maintenance of effort requirements has already substantially 
burdened the legislative deliberations of State Legislator Plaintiffs and other state 
legislators by preventing them from freely exercising their legislative powers and 
voting rights to make crucial budget cuts during the 2010 legislative session. 
 111.  Specifically, after the Act‟s enactment, Arizona legislators, including 
State Legislator Plaintiffs, were compelled by the threat of the loss of federal 
matching funds to vote for legislation complying with the Act‟s new Medicaid 
eligibility and maintenance of effort requirements.  In so doing, State Legislator 
Plaintiffs overrode their earlier decision to vote for legislation that would have 
allowed the State to comply with its constitutional balanced budget requirements 
by eliminating the diversion of $2 billion dollars in general fund revenues to the 
“KidsCare” program (an insurance program for children whose family income is 
too high to qualify for AHCCCS) and Proposition 204 as of fiscal year 2010-11. 
 112.  State Legislator Plaintiffs intend to introduce a bill in any 2010 special 
legislative sessions or 2011 legislative session, to cut the funding to KidsCare and 
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Proposition 204, in order to fund the Medicaid and maintenance of efforts 
requirements that PPACA requires them to fund. 
 113.  In addition to expanding Medicaid coverage, the Act requires states to 
exercise oversight over health insurance sales to ensure value for the consumer, 
H.B. 3590 § 1001 (42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(b) (2010)), review and report premium 
increases to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, H.B. 3590 § 1001 (42 
U.S.C. § 300gg-94(b) (2010)), and establish offices of health insurance consumer 
assistance or ombudsman programs, H.B. 3590 § 1001 (42 U.S.C. § 300gg-93(a) 
(2010)) (collectively the “consumer mandate”).  
 114.  The Act also mandates that Arizona take administrative action and 
assume substantial administrative costs for, inter alia, hiring and training new 
employees, as well as requiring that new and existing employees devote a 
considerable portion of their time to implementing the Act (collectively the 
“administrative mandate”). 
 115.  The Act also requires states to establish insurance exchanges by 
January 1, 2014 (hereinafter the “health exchange mandate”), declaring that an 
exchange shall be “a governmental agency or nonprofit entity that is established 
by a State,” H.B. 3590 § 1001 (42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(1) (2010)), which 
“facilitates the purchase of qualified health plans,”  H.B. 3590 § 1001 (42 U.S.C. 
§ 18031(b)(1) (2010)), by individuals and small businesses. 
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 116.  The Act dictates that exchanges must implement procedures for the 
certification of health plans, operate a toll-free hotline and website to provide 
assistance, rate each offered health plan according to federal criteria, inform 
individuals of their eligibility for Medicaid and enroll new members, grant 
individual mandate exemptions and report those exemptions to the Treasury 
Department, and coordinate coverage between employers and employees.  H.B. 
3590 § 1001 (42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(4) (2010)). 
 117.  If a state fails and refuses to establish its own health exchange, the 
federal government will “establish and operate” an insurance exchange, coercively 
threatening to wholly displace the state‟s sovereign police power to regulate the 
insurance industry within state boundaries if the state fails to acquiesce in the 
mandate to establish a health insurance exchange.  H.B. 3590 § 1001 (42 U.S.C. § 
18041(c)(1) (2010)). 
 118.  The Act also directly imposes an employer mandate on the State of 
Arizona requiring Arizona to maintain certain minimum health benefits for its 
employees under the threat of various penalties that threaten annual liabilities to 
the State in excess of several million dollars for noncompliance (hereinafter the 
“employer mandate”).   H.B. 3590 (as modified by H.B. 4872 § 1003) § 1513 
(I.R.C. § 4980h (2010)). 
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 119.  No Arizona government entity or infrastructure currently exists to 
adequately discharge all the responsibilities that will be necessary to implement 
the various mandates of the Act, to meet requirements related to increases in 
Medicaid enrollment under the Act, and to operate healthcare insurance exchanges 
required by the Act. 
 120.  The individual, consumer, administrative, employer, health exchange 
and Medicaid eligibility and maintenance of effort mandates of the Act 
(hereinafter the “Act‟s mandates”), substantially burden State Legislator Plaintiffs 
and other legislators‟ quasi-sovereign legislative voting power over state 
legislation and appropriations concerning the cost, nature and structure of Arizona 
state government, compelling them to vote in the manner preferred by the federal 
government in the controversial area of health care policy. 
 121.  Plaintiff Nick Coons‟ quasi-sovereign voting power is also burdened 
by the Act‟s mandates because they threaten to curtail the subject matter over 
which Coons is free to exercise his direct legislative authority under the initiative 
and referendum provisions of the Arizona Constitution.  See, e.g., art. 4, pt. 1, § 1; 
art. 4, pt. 2, § 24; art. 9, § 23; art. 22, § 14. 
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CAUSES OF ACTION 
Count I 
 
The Act Violates the Fifth and Ninth Amendments’ 
Guarantee of Medical Autonomy 
 
 122.  Plaintiffs reallege, adopt and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 
through 121 above as though fully set forth herein. 
 123.  Arizona enacted legislation (hereinafter the “Health Care Freedom 
Public Policy”) declaring: “The legislature finds that the patient protection and 
affordable care act (P.L. 111-148) violates the public policy of this state.”  H.B. 
2002(2) (Ariz. 2010), available at 
http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg/8s/bills/hb2002h.pdf (last visited August 5, 
2010).  
 124.   Pursuant to its Health Care Freedom Public Policy, Arizona has 
resolved: 
A) The power to require or regulate a person‟s choice in the mode of 
securing lawful health care services, or to impose a penalty related to that 
choice, is not found in the constitution of the United States of America, and 
is therefore a power reserved to the people pursuant to the tenth 
amendment.  This state exercises its sovereign power to declare the public 
policy of this state regarding the right of all persons residing in this state in 
choosing the mode of securing lawful health care services. 
 
B)  It is the public policy of this state, consistent with all constitutionally 
enumerated rights, as well as those rights otherwise retained by the people, 
that every person in this state may choose or decline to choose any mode of 
securing lawful health care services without penalty or threat of penalty. 
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C) The public policy stated in this section does not apply to impair any right 
of contract related to the provision of lawful health care services to any 
person or group. 
 
D) The public policy stated in this section does not prohibit or limit care 
provided pursuant to article xviii, section 8, constitution of Arizona, or any 
statutes enacted by the legislature relating to workers' compensation. 
 
E) A public official or an employee or agent of this state or any political 
subdivision of this state shall not act to impose, collect, enforce or 
effectuate any penalty in this state that violates the public policy prescribed 
in this section. 
 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-1301 (2010). 
 
 125.  Additionally, during the upcoming November 2010 election cycle, 
Arizonans will vote on a state constitutional amendment called the Arizona Health 
Care Freedom Act. 
 126.   The Arizona Health Care Freedom Act states:  
To preserve the freedom of Arizonans to provide for their health care a law 
or rule shall not compel, directly or indirectly, any person, employer or 
health care provider to participate in any health care system.  A person or 
employer may pay directly for lawful health care services and shall not be 
required to pay penalties or fines for paying directly for lawful health care 
services, a health care provider may accept direct payment for lawful health 
care services and shall not be required to pay penalties or fines for 
accepting direct payment from a person or employer for lawful health care 
services.  Subject to reasonable and necessary rules that do not substantially 
limit a person‟s options, the purchase or sale of health insurance in private 
health care systems shall not be prohibited by law or rule. 
 
H.C.R. 2014(1) (Ariz. 2009), available at 
http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg/1r/bills/hcr2014h.pdf (last visited August 5, 
2010).  
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 127.  Plaintiff Coons has the right to control his body, to create or refrain 
from creating a doctor-patient relationship, to accept or refuse medical treatment, 
and to make health care choices with the assistance of health care professionals 
(hereinafter the “right to medical autonomy”).  
 128.  Plaintiff Coons‟ right to medical autonomy is a fundamental right that 
is rooted in Arizona state law as well as the legally privileged status, privacy and 
intimacy of the doctor-patient relationship under the Anglo-American conception 
of ordered liberty, and the constitutional rights to life and liberty, which imply the 
right to be left alone by the government to make personal health care decisions. 
 129.  Plaintiff Coons‟ right to medical autonomy is protected by the liberty 
guarantees of the Fifth and Ninth Amendments.  See Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 
U.S. 727, 737 (1984) (Stephens, J., concurring) (observing Ninth Amendment 
protects rights created by state law); Acme, Inc. v. Besson, 10 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D. 
N.J. 1935) (indicating the “local, intimate, and close relationships of persons and 
property which arise in the processes of manufacture” are protected by the Ninth 
and Tenth Amendments); Magill v. Brown, 16 F. Cas. 408, 428 (E.D. Pa. 1833) 
(observing “personal rights are protected by . . . the 9th amendment”). 
 130.  The individual mandate unduly burdens and places a substantial 
obstacle in the path of Plaintiff Coons‟ exercising his right to medical autonomy 
by forcing him to apply limited financial resources to obtaining a health care plan 
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he does not desire or otherwise to save his income to pay a penalty, both of which 
mandates necessarily reduce the health care treatments and doctor-patient 
relationships he can afford to choose. 
 131.  The individual mandate unduly burdens and places a substantial 
obstacle in the path of Plaintiff Coons‟ exercising his right to medical autonomy 
by forcing him to create or risk creating an intimate relationship concerning his 
health and medical care with millions of non-physician intermediaries employed 
by health insurers, rather than directly with the physician of his choice.  
Depending on the insurance plans available to him, Plaintiff Coons‟ choice of 
physicians and/or medical services may be curtailed.  
 132.  Additionally, the Act unduly burdens and places a substantial obstacle 
in the path of Plaintiff Coons‟ exercising his right to medical autonomy by 
imposing the threat of health care price controls and/or similar regulation that will 
limit his access to medical treatment, hospitals, drugs, and physicians. 
 133.  Taken together, the Act‟s individual mandate, and related regulatory 
authority, including the establishment of IPAB, cause irreparable injury by 
violating Plaintiff Coons‟ right to medical autonomy under the Fifth and Ninth 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 
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Count II 
The Act Violates the Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendment’s 
Guarantee of Privacy 
 
 134.   Plaintiffs reallege, adopt and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 
through 133 above as though fully set forth herein. 
 135.  Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, without a search warrant or 
equivalent legal process subject to judicial review, the federal government cannot 
obtain directly from citizens the personal information and medical records the 
individual mandate forces citizens such as Plaintiff Coons to disclose or authorize 
to be disclosed to health plans and health insurance issuers.  
 136.  Nevertheless, the federal government is legally authorized by HIPAA 
to access the personal information and medical records the individual mandate 
forces citizens such as Plaintiff Coons to disclose or authorize to be disclosed to 
health plans and health insurance issuers without genuine consent, a search 
warrant or equivalent legal process subject to judicial review. 
 137.  The individual mandate circumvents and violates the Fourth 
Amendment‟s guarantee of security against unreasonable searches and seizures by 
forcing citizens, such as Plaintiff Coons, to consent under the threat of a penalty, 
to authorize access to personal medical records and information to health 
insurance issuers, to which the government would also have access.  Without 
genuine consent, a search warrant or equivalent legal process subject to judicial 
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review, the federal government would not otherwise have access to citizens‟ 
personal medical information.  
 138.  In essence, the individual mandate transforms the insurance 
application process into a conduit by which the federal government can obtain 
personal medical records of citizens such as Plaintiff Coons without genuine 
consent, a search warrant or equivalent legal process subject to judicial review. 
 139.  By depriving and/or threatening to deprive Plaintiff Coons of the 
ability to control access to his medical information, history and records, the 
individual mandate, and related penalty, causes irreparable injury by violating 
Plaintiff Nick Coons‟ liberty and privacy rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth 
Amendments because the mandate requires a highly intrusive search and seizure 
that burdens his liberty interest in maintaining confidentiality in his medical 
information and records, without being reasonably related, much less 
substantially, closely or narrowly tailored, to advancing any substantial, important 
or compelling governmental interest. 
Count III 
The Act Violates the First Amendment by Burdening 
State Legislator-Plaintiffs’ Legislative Voting Powers 
 
 140.  Plaintiffs reallege, adopt and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 
through 139 above as though fully set forth herein.  
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 141.  The First Amendment requires that legislators be given “the widest 
latitude to express their views on issues of policy.”  Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 
136 (1966). 
 142.  The “the act of voting on public issues by a member of a public 
agency or board comes within the freedom of speech guarantee of the first 
amendment" and “there can be no more definite expression of opinion than by 
voting on a controversial public issue.”  Clarke v. United States, 886 F.2d 404, 
405 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (quoting Miller v. Town of Hull, 878 F.2d 523, 532 (1st Cir. 
1989)), vacated as moot, 915 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 143.  State Legislator Plaintiffs and other state legislators have a First 
Amendment right and a state constitutional duty to exercise their legislative voting 
powers with the widest latitude to express their views on issues of health care 
policy and are entitled to “broad protections” under the First Amendment from 
federal government interference and influence when they exercise their voting 
powers accordingly.  Clarke, 886 F.2d at 410. 
 144.  By imposing the Act‟s new Medicaid eligibility and maintenance 
requirements on Arizona as a condition of receiving billions of dollars of federal 
Medicaid funding, and by imposing additional consumer, administrative, 
employer and health exchange mandates, the Act exerts virtually irresistible 
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pressure on State Legislator Plaintiffs and other state legislators to vote, and to 
vote in a particular way on controversial issues of health care policy. 
 145.  The Act thereby substantially burdens speech protected by the First 
Amendment, and burdens substantially more speech than is essential to the 
furtherance of the federal government‟s asserted interests in imposing those 
conditions, causing State Legislator Plaintiffs and other state legislators 
irreparable harm by violating their First Amendment rights. 
 146.   Moreover, because the federal government may not withhold 
discretionary benefits in order to pressure citizens to waive inalienable 
constitutional rights, the Act‟s new Medicaid eligibility and maintenance 
requirements constitute unconstitutional conditions imposed on the receipt of 
federal funds, which have caused State Legislator Plaintiffs irreparable harm by 
violating their First Amendment rights.  See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 
254, 262-63 (1970) (welfare benefits cannot be conditioned on waiver of 
procedural due process rights); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-06 (1963) 
(free exercise clause bars conditioning of unemployment benefits on agreement to 
work on Sabbath); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518-19 (1958) (First 
Amendment bars conditioning of tax exemption on showing that taxpayer had not 
engaged in subversive advocacy). 
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Count IV 
 
By Entrenching IPAB, the Act Exceeds Congressional Powers and Violates 
the First Amendment by Burdening the Legislative Voting Powers of 
Plaintiffs Flake, Franks and Shadegg 
 
 147.  Plaintiffs reallege, adopt and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 
through 146 above as though fully set forth herein. 
 148.  The legislative power of Congress does not include the power to 
entrench legislation from being altered by future Congresses because Congress, by 
statute, cannot alter the constitutional procedure required for the passage of laws.   
U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 7; Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315, 318 (1932) 
(stating that “the will of a particular Congress . . . does not impose itself upon 
those to follow in succeeding years”). 
 149.  Correspondingly, the parliamentary rulemaking power of each House 
does not include the power to entrench, by statute, parliamentary rules from 
alteration by the Houses of future Congresses.  See  U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5. 
 150.  Congress has no power to entrench legislation and parliamentary 
rules, by statute, protecting IPAB‟s proposals, recommendations and enabling 
statutes from future modification, amendment or repeal by future congresses.  See 
id.  
 151.  Furthermore, to the very extent the Act entrenches IPAB‟s proposals, 
recommendations and enabling statutes from future modification, amendment or 
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repeal by future congresses, the Act substantially burdens the voting powers of 
Plaintiffs U.S. Representatives Flake, Franks and Shadegg and other federal 
legislators. 
 152.  The Act‟s entrenchment of IPAB‟s proposals, recommendations and 
enabling statutes from future modification, amendment or repeal by future 
congresses, burdens substantially more speech than is essential to the furtherance 
of the federal government‟s asserted interests in imposing those restrictions. 
 153.  The Act‟s entrenchment of IPAB‟s proposals, recommendations and 
enabling statutes from future modification, amendment or repeal by future 
congresses, causes irreparable injury by violating the First Amendment voting 
rights of Plaintiffs U.S. Representatives Flake, Franks, Shadegg and other federal 
legislators. 
Count V 
The Act Exceeds the Federal Government’s Commerce Clause Power 
 154.  Plaintiffs reallege, adopt and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 
through 153 above as though fully set forth herein.  
 155.   The individual mandate is an essential element of the Act without 
which it would not have been passed by Congress. 
 156.   The Act contains no severability provision for any of its provisions. 
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 157.  Under the Act, otherwise uninsured persons, including Plaintiff 
Coons, are forced to purchase private health care coverage not because they are 
even tangentially engaged in the production, distribution, or consumption of 
goods, services or commodities or any other commercial activity, but simply 
because they exist.  
 158.  The individual mandate compels uninsured persons to enroll in state 
Medicaid programs if they cannot afford private health care coverage. 
 159.   Imposing the individual mandate upon United States residents, 
including Plaintiff Coons, who choose not to contract for health care coverage as 
set forth in the Act is not regulating economic activity. 
 160.  Because Congress‟s authority is not absolute, the power to enact the 
Act must be found in one of Congress‟s enumerated powers in order to be 
constitutionally valid. 
 161.  Congress authored, passed, and supports the Act based on an 
extraordinarily broad interpretation of the Commerce Clause.  See H.B. 3590 § 
1501(a) (1)-(2). 
 162.  Adopting Congress‟ interpretation of the Commerce Clause, as is 
implicit in the statute, would fundamentally transform our society by eliminating 
the vertical separation of power guaranteed by federalism, as well as the related 
individual liberty guarantees found in the Constitution. 
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 163.  Before the Act‟s passage, the United States Senate evinced doubt that 
it had the power to adopt the individual mandate under the Commerce Clause.  
Because of those concerns, the Senate Finance Committee asked the 
Congressional Research Service (“CRS”) to opine on the constitutionality of the 
individual mandate.  The CRS concluded that “[w]hether such a requirement 
would be constitutional under the Commerce Clause is perhaps the most 
challenging question posed by such a proposal, as it is a novel issue whether 
Congress may use this Clause to require an individual to purchase a good or 
service.”  Jennifer Staman & Cynthia Brougher, Requiring Individuals to Obtain 
Health Insurance: A Constitutional Analysis 3 (Cong. Research Serv. July 24, 
2009), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40725_20090724.pdf (last 
visited August 5, 2010).  
 164.  As early as 1994, the Congressional Budget Office acknowledged that 
a “mandate requiring all individuals to purchase health insurance would be an 
unprecedented form of federal action.  The government has never required people 
to buy a good or service as a condition of lawful residence in the United States.”  
Cong. Budget Office, The Budgetary Treatment of an Individual Mandate to Buy 
Health Insurance (August 1994), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/48xx/doc4816/doc38.pdf (last visited August 5, 
2010).  
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 165.  Some members of Congress attempted to justify the Act‟s individual 
mandate by analogizing it to policies requiring drivers to maintain automobile 
insurance.  This analogy is flawed.  The principal purpose of automobile insurance 
is to provide financial protection for others in the event that the driver causes them 
injury.  Moreover, automobile insurance is a conditional exchange for having a 
state issue the privilege of a driver‟s license.  A driver, however, is not mandated 
to have a driver‟s license or automobile insurance unless the driver wishes to drive 
an automobile on public roads.  More importantly, driver‟s license and automobile 
insurance laws are state, rather than federal requirements, because the federal 
government does not have a general police power.  
 166.  An individual mandate that requires a citizen to enter into a contract 
with, or buy a particular product from a private party, or to participate in a 
government health care program, with penalties to enforce the mandate, is 
unprecedented in scope and in kind.  Even in wartime, when the production of 
material is crucial to national security, Congress has never claimed a power under 
the Commerce Clause to force production where there is none.  For example, 
during World War II, the federal government did not compel farmers to grow food 
for troops or workers to build tanks.  While the federal government encouraged 
individuals to buy war bonds to finance the Nation‟s war efforts, it never required 
them to do so under penalty of law.  Clearly, what Congress cannot do even at a 
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time when our Nation‟s survival is threatened, it cannot do in peacetime simply to 
avoid the severe political costs of raising taxes to pay for wildly unpopular 
government programs.  
 167.  The immense power now claimed by the federal government and 
Defendants does not comport with either the text or purpose of the Commerce 
Clause.  The Constitution gives Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with Indian Tribes.”  U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  The Commerce Clause does not give Congress the power 
to regulate all commerce and everything having any effect thereon.  
 168.  Congress may not, under the guise of regulating commerce, expand its 
powers beyond limit.  As Justice Kennedy observes in United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549, 577 (1995), “Were the federal government to take over the regulation of 
entire areas of traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the 
regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal 
and state authority would blur and political responsibility would become illusory.” 
Every activity affects commerce in some tangential or insignificant way.  Had the 
founders intended that the commerce power be unlimited, enumerating three 
categories of commerce for Congress to regulate would have been unnecessary. 
 169.  Indeed, the enumerated powers are all superfluous and without real 
effect if the commerce power extends to any matter that has any effect on 
 Page 51 of 78 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
12 
 
13 
 
14 
 
15 
 
16 
 
17 
 
18 
 
19 
 
20 
 
21 
 
22 
 
23 
 
24 
 
25 
 
26 
 
27 
 
28 
 
commerce.  Such an interpretation violates the traditional rule that the 
Constitution should not be interpreted to render other portions of the document 
meaningless. 
 170.   For Congress to regulate activity under the Commerce Clause, the 
activity itself must be commercial because “the power to regulate „commerce‟ can 
by no means encompass authority over mere gun possession any more than it 
empowers the federal government to regulate marriage, littering, or cruelty to 
animals, throughout the 50 states.  Our Constitution quite properly leaves such 
matters to the individual States, notwithstanding these activities‟ effects on 
interstate commerce.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
  171.  Recently, in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) and 
Lopez, the Court struck down attempts to regulate non-commercial activities 
based upon their predicated effects on interstate commerce because those attempts 
went beyond the outer limits of the Commerce Clause.  Gonzales v. Raich, 545 
U.S. 1, 25 (2005) (reaffirming the principles set forth in Morrison and Lopez). 
 172.  The Supreme Court recognizes that “the mere fact that Congress has 
said when a particular activity shall be deemed to affect commerce does not 
preclude further examination by this Court.”  Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 
294, 303 (1964); see Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n., 452 
U.S. 264, 311 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
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 173.  The status of being a citizen of Arizona is not equivalent to being in a 
channel of interstate commerce, nor a person or thing in instate commerce, nor is 
it an activity arising out of or connected with a commercial transaction.  Indeed, 
the status arises from an absence of commerce, not from some sort of economic 
endeavor, and is not even a non-economic activity affecting interstate commerce.  
It is entirely passive. 
 174.  While the Supreme Court has not adopted a categorical rule against 
aggregating the effects of any non-economic activity thus far in our history, the 
Court has never held that the Commerce Clause, even when aided by the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, can be used to require citizens to buy goods or 
services.  To depart from our history and permit the federal government to require 
individuals to purchase goods or services deprives the Commerce Clause of any 
effective limit contrary to Lopez and Morrision.  It would mutate Congress‟s 
enumerated powers into a general police power in total derogation of the Nation‟s 
constitutional scheme.  
 175.  Congress lacks authority to impose the individual mandate under the 
Commerce Clause.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 176.  The individual mandate currently burdens and will continue to burden 
Plaintiff Coons‟ liberty and privacy interests, as well as his quasi-sovereign 
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interest in freely exercising his legislative power of initiative and referendum by 
denying and/or diminishing their otherwise lawful scope and effectiveness. 
 177.  The individual mandate injures Plaintiff Coons with current and/or 
threatened economic harm, the inevitability of which is patent.  See, e.g., Okpalobi 
v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 350 (5th Cir. 1999).  
 178.  By increasing and threatening to increase the financial burden of the 
Act‟s increased Medicaid eligibility and maintenance of effort requirements, the 
individual mandate currently burdens and will continue to burden State Legislator 
Plaintiffs and other state legislators‟ liberty and quasi-sovereign interests in 
legislative voting, as well as their state constitutional voting duties by contributing 
to the diminishment of their otherwise lawful scope and effectiveness. 
 179.  By increasing demand for medical services and thereby increasing the 
likelihood of IPAB issuing additional entrenched recommendations and proposals, 
the individual mandate currently burdens and will continue to burden Plaintiffs 
Franks, Flake and Shadegg and other legislators‟ liberty and quasi-sovereign 
interests in legislative voting, as well as their constitutional voting duties by 
contributing to the diminishment of their otherwise lawful scope and 
effectiveness. 
 180.  The concrete current and future burdens of the individual mandate are 
currently causing actual and well-founded worry, fear and anguish to Plaintiffs. 
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Count VI 
The Act Exceeds the Federal Government’s Taxing Power 
 181.  Plaintiffs reallege, adopt and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 
through 180 above as though fully set forth herein.  
 182.  Apart from a tax on income, the federal government has no power 
under the Constitution to levy a direct (capitation) tax unless it is apportioned 
among the states.  See U.S. CONST., art. I, §§ 3 and 7, cl. 4.  
 183.  Apportionment under the Constitution requires: (1) Congress to 
declare a revenue target for the tax; (2) the required revenue to be divided among 
the states in proportion to their census populations; and (3) each state to divide its 
required revenue by its tax base to produce an individual tax rate. 
 184.  Apart from income taxes, apportioned direct taxes, imposts and duties, 
the federal government may only levy excise taxes.  An excise tax is imposed on 
the performance of an act, the engaging in an occupation or the enjoyment of a 
privilege. 
 185.  The individual mandate penalty is neither an apportioned direct tax, 
nor an income tax, nor an excise tax, nor an impost or duty. 
 186.  If it were a tax, the individual mandate penalty could only be 
classified as an unapportioned direct tax, for which the federal government would 
lack the taxing power to levy. 
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 187.  If it were a tax, the penalty imposed by the Act to enforce the 
individual mandate would violate the U.S. Constitution. 
 188.  If it were a tax, the federal government cannot under any 
circumstances prevail in collecting the individual mandate penalty. 
 189.  Congress lacks authority under its taxing powers, as delegated by 
Article I, and by implication, the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution, to 
impose the individual mandate penalty. 
 190.  The individual mandate penalty currently burdens and will continue to 
burden Plaintiff Coons‟ liberty and privacy interests, as well as his quasi-
sovereign interest in freely exercising his legislative power of initiative and 
referendum by denying and/or diminishing their otherwise lawful scope and 
effectiveness. 
 191.  The individual mandate penalty injures Plaintiff Coons with current 
and/or threatened economic harm, the inevitability of which is patent.  See, e.g., 
Okpalobi, 190 F.3d at 350. 
 192.  By increasing and threatening to increase the financial burden of the 
Act‟s increased Medicaid eligibility and maintenance of effort requirements, the 
individual mandate penalty currently burdens and will continue to burden State 
Legislator Plaintiffs and other state legislators‟ liberty and quasi-sovereign 
interests in legislative voting, as well as their state constitutional voting duties by 
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contributing to the diminishment of their otherwise lawful scope and 
effectiveness. 
 193.  By increasing demand for medical services and thereby increasing the 
likelihood of IPAB issuing additional entrenched recommendations and proposals, 
the individual mandate penalty currently burdens and will continue to burden 
Plaintiffs Flake, Franks and Shadegg and other legislators‟ liberty and quasi-
sovereign interests in legislative voting, as well as their constitutional voting 
duties by contributing to the diminishment of their otherwise lawful scope and 
effectiveness. 
 194.  The concrete current and future burdens of the individual mandate are 
currently causing actual and well-founded worry, fear, and anguish to Plaintiffs. 
Count VII 
The Act Exceeds the Federal Government’s Spending Power 
 195.   Plaintiffs reallege, adopt and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 
through 194 above as though fully set forth herein.  
 196.   Arizona‟s decision to participate in the Medicaid program was made 
in the context of program requirements for coverage of specific populations and 
options for state flexibility. 
 197.  Arizona agreed to participate in Medicaid in reasonable reliance upon 
the reasonable understanding and expectation that its participation would be 
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knowing and voluntary, as a matter of both law and fact, and that there would be 
no duress or unconscionable conditions imposed by the federal government on the 
State that could prevent it from freely opting out of Medicaid to set up its own 
state health and welfare plans, or to provide no such benefits at all.   
 198.  Arizona agreed to participate in Medicaid in reasonable reliance upon 
the understanding and expectation that it would have considerable discretion to 
implement and operate its respective optional Medicaid programs in accordance 
with state-specific designs regarding eligibility, enrollment, and administration, so 
long as the programs met broad federal requirements, which did not seek to 
micromanage the details of program operation, override the State‟s reasonable 
discretion to conform the program to local conditions, or commandeer the State‟s 
operational discretion. 
 199.  Arizona did not agree to become Medicaid partners of the federal 
government with the understanding or expectation that the terms of its 
participation would be altered significantly by the federal government so as to 
make it financially infeasible and impracticable for Arizona to remain in or to 
withdraw from the Medicaid program.  
 200.  Arizona did not agree to become Medicaid partners of the federal 
government with the understanding or expectation that the federal government 
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would increase significantly its control and reduce significantly Arizona‟s 
discretion with respect to the Medicaid program. 
 201.  Arizona did not agree to become Medicaid partners of the federal 
government with the understanding or expectation that, after the Medicaid 
program become entrenched in Arizona, the federal government would alter the 
program‟s requirements to expand eligibility for enrollment beyond the State‟s 
ability to fund its participation. 
 202.  Arizona did not agree to become Medicaid partners of the federal 
government with an expectation that the federal government would exploit its 
control over Medicaid terms and eligibility as part of a coercive scheme to force 
all citizens and residents of the United States to acquire health insurance.  
 203.  Over the decades of Medicaid‟s existence in Arizona, innumerable 
residents of Arizona have become dependent upon Medicaid and such dependency 
is so pronounced that the State cannot responsibly opt out of Medicaid without a 
reasonable transition period. 
 204.  Despite dramatically and unforeseeably increasing the cost of 
maintaining participation in Medicaid in the midst of a financial crisis, the Act 
does not allow for the State to gradually opt out of the system. 
 205.  Instead, the Act forces Arizona to choose between accepting 
conditions on the receipt of federal money that on the one hand involve 
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surrendering Arizona‟s budget priorities, and its exclusive police, taxing and 
spending powers to the federal government, and on the other hand abandoning its 
constitutional debt limit and vulnerable residents who have been induced into 
desperate reliance upon the Medicaid system for their health care needs.   
 206.  The Act forces an unconscionable “Hobson‟s choice” upon Arizona 
by the federal government‟s leveraging circumstances of extreme economic 
duress to convert what was a voluntary federal-state partnership into an adhesive 
top-down federal program, in derogation of the principle of federalism upon 
which the United States was founded. 
 207.  State officials could not have been reasonably expected to know that 
opting into the Medicaid program from its inception could have such 
consequences or place them in such a grossly unequal and dependent bargaining 
position relative to the federal government.  In particular, state officials did not 
foresee and could not have foreseen how the Act‟s new Medicaid eligibility and 
maintenance of effort requirements would leverage the coverage requirements of 
Proposition 204 to impose a burden on Arizona in funding the Medicaid program 
that is far in excess of nearly any other state. 
 208.  Furthermore, the Act is so wide-ranging, lengthy and complex, and 
delegates so much power to currently nonexistent officials and agencies, that the 
 Page 60 of 78 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
12 
 
13 
 
14 
 
15 
 
16 
 
17 
 
18 
 
19 
 
20 
 
21 
 
22 
 
23 
 
24 
 
25 
 
26 
 
27 
 
28 
 
conditions imposed by the Act on the receipt of related federal funding cannot 
possibly be regarded as “unambiguous.” 
 209.  Especially in light of the unintended consequences of possible future 
ballot initiative measures, it is impossible for state officials to fully understand 
and appreciate the consequences of acquiescing in the latest conditions imposed 
on the receipt of federal funding under the Act in connection with the new 
Medicaid eligibility or maintenance of effort requirements or any other mandate 
existing or yet to be discovered among the Act‟s hundreds of pages. 
 210.  In the absence of a full and knowing appreciation of the consequences 
of opting into the Medicaid program and acquiescing in the latest conditions 
imposed on the receipt of federal Medicaid funding under the Act, and against the 
backdrop of the state‟s fiscal crisis, the federal government is essentially inducing 
Arizona and other states to blindly surrender their sovereignty in exchange for 
federal funds. 
 211.  Congress lacks authority under its spending powers, as delegated by 
Article I of the Constitution, to induce Arizona to accept federal funding on such 
conditions. 
 212.  The Act‟s new Medicaid eligibility or maintenance of effort 
requirements currently burden and will continue to burden Plaintiff Coons‟ quasi-
sovereign interest in freely exercising his legislative power of initiative and 
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referendum by denying and/or diminishing their otherwise lawful scope and 
effectiveness. 
 213.  The Act‟s new Medicaid eligibility or maintenance of effort 
requirements currently burden and will continue to burden State Legislator 
Plaintiffs and other state legislators‟ liberty and quasi-sovereign interests in 
legislative voting, as well as their state constitutional voting duties by contributing 
to the diminishment of their otherwise lawful scope and effectiveness. 
 214.  By increasing demand for medical services and thereby increasing the 
likelihood of IPAB issuing additional entrenched recommendations and proposals, 
the Act‟s new Medicaid eligibility or maintenance of effort requirements currently  
burden and will continue to burden Plaintiffs Flake, Franks and Shadegg and other 
federal legislators‟ liberty and quasi-sovereign interests in legislative voting, as 
well as their constitutional voting duties by contributing to the diminishment of 
their otherwise lawful scope and effectiveness. 
 215.  The concrete current and future burdens of the Act‟s new Medicaid 
eligibility or maintenance of effort requirements are currently causing actual and 
well-founded worry, fear and anguish to Plaintiffs. 
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Count VIII 
The Act’s Establishment of IPAB Violates Separation of Powers Doctrine 
 
 216.  Plaintiffs reallege, adopt and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 
through 215 above as though fully set forth herein.  
 217.  The legislative power of Congress does not include the power to 
delegate legislative authority to an executive agency without an intelligible 
principle to constrain the exercise of such authority.  A. L. A. Schechter Poultry 
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 218.  IPAB is an executive agency with its members appointed by the 
President, which also has legislative powers, over which there is no meaningful 
Congressional review or any judicial review of its actions.  
 219.  Even where the legislative power of Congress is delegated to an 
executive agency with an intelligible principle to guide its exercise, judicial 
review must be preserved to ensure the agency stays within the bounds set by 
Congress.  INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983); Yakus v. United States, 
321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944); Lathrop, Shea & Henwood Co. v. Interior Constr. & 
Improv. Co., 215 U.S. 246, 262 (1909).  
 220.  By carving out a discrete list of limitations on IPAB‟s delegated 
powers, the Act implicitly gives IPAB otherwise unlimited power to exercise any 
enumerated congressional power with respect to any governmental body, industry, 
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property, product, person, service or activity through its proposals and 
recommendations, provided that such exercise “relates” in an undefined way to 
the Medicare program.   H.B. 3590 (as modified by H.B. 4872) § 3403 (42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395kkk(c) (1)(A) and (2)(C) (2010)). 
 221.  Aside from the Act‟s discrete list of limitations on IPAB‟s delegated 
powers, nothing in the Act otherwise prevents IPAB from proposing and 
recommending any kind or magnitude of regulation or taxation of any industry, 
property, product, person, service or activity, which is within the power of 
Congress to enact, provided such regulation or taxation “relates” to the “Medicare 
program.” 
 222.  Nothing in the Act precludes IPAB from proposing and 
recommending the appropriation of federal funds and the imposition of conditions 
on the receipt of such funds by any government, industry, property, product, 
person, service or activity, including, but not limited to, conditions requiring 
states, such as Arizona, to implement federal laws or enact new state laws 
enforcing price controls or pricing mandates in order to receive federal funding. 
 223.  The Act provides almost no limit on and no intelligible standard 
constraining the exercise of legislative power by IPAB. 
 224.  The Act not only delegates vast legislative powers to IPAB, it 
purports to entrench the delegation of such powers against review by future 
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Congresses, and further explicitly prohibits administrative and judicial review of 
the implementation of IPAB‟s proposals and recommendations.  H.B. 3590 (as 
modified by H.B. 4872) § 3403 (42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(e)(5) (2010)). 
 225.  The Act‟s effort to delegate and entrench IPAB‟s exercise of 
legislative power from congressional and judicial review is beyond the legislative 
power of Congress to enact under the United States Constitution. 
 226.  The Act‟s delegation of vast legislative powers to IPAB without 
intelligible standards, with attenuated congressional review and without judicial 
review violates the doctrine of separation of powers. 
 227.  Congress lacks the constitutional power to establish IPAB under the 
doctrine of separation of powers. 
 228.  The establishment of IPAB currently burdens and will continue to 
burden Plaintiff Flake, Franks and Shadegg and other federal legislators‟ liberty 
and quasi-sovereign interests in legislative voting, as well as their constitutional 
voting duties by contributing to the diminishment of their otherwise lawful scope 
and effectiveness. 
 229.  The concrete current and future burdens of the establishment of IPAB 
are presently causing actual and well-founded worry, fear and anguish to 
Plaintiffs. 
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Count IX 
 
The Act Exceeds the Implied Power Granted 
By the Necessary and Proper Clause 
 
 230.  Plaintiffs reallege, adopt and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 
through 229 above as though fully set forth herein.  
 231.  The Necessary and Proper Clause confers implied supplemental 
power upon the federal government only when the means adopted to exercise an 
expressly enumerated power are: a) “appropriate”; b) “„plainly adapted‟ to that 
end”; and c) “consistent with the letter and spirit of the [C]onstitution.”  Gonzales, 
545 U.S. at 39 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 U.S. 316, 
421 (1819)). 
 232.  It is axiomatic that the federal government has limited and enumerated 
powers, which are divided and horizontally separated into distinct executive, 
legislative and judicial branches of government.  McCulloch, 4 U.S. at 405 (“The 
government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers.”); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison) (“[I]t is to be remembered that the general 
government is not to be charged with the whole power of making and 
administering laws.  Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects, which 
concern all the members of the republic, but which are not to be attained by the 
separate provisions of any.  The subordinate governments, which can extend their 
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care to all those other subjects which can be separately provided for, will retain 
their due authority and activity.”). 
 233.  Additionally, “our Constitution establishes a system of dual 
sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government.”  Gregory v. 
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).  Indeed, the Constitution‟s great innovation is 
that “citizens . . . have two political capacities, one state and one federal, each 
protected from incursion by the other.”  U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 
U.S. 779, 838 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  It is a “legal system unprecedented in 
form and design, establishing two orders of government, each with its own direct 
relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the 
people who sustain it and are governed by it.”  Id. 
 234.  The letter and spirit of the constitution thus guarantees the 
preservation of state sovereignty by requiring the maintenance of a “compound 
republic” that vertically separates powers between the states and the federal 
government.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (enumerating congressional powers); id. 
at art. I, § 10 (limiting powers of the states); id. at art. IV, § 4 (guaranteeing the 
States a Republican Form of Government); id. at art. V (incorporating States and 
Congress into the amendment process); id. at art. VI (making federal law 
supreme); id. at amend. X (reserving to the States powers not delegated); id. at 
amend. XI (making the States immune to suit in federal court); Printz v. United 
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States, 521 U.S. 898, 921-23 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 
187-88 (1992). 
 235.  The Constitution‟s guarantee of a vertical separation of powers is not 
an end-in-itself.  New York, 505 U.S. at 181.  The Founders intended for 
federalism to prevent the abuse of power by diffusing concentrations of power.  
Id. at 187-88 (observing that the Constitution “divides power among sovereigns 
and among branches of government precisely so that we may resist the temptation 
to concentrate power in one location as an expedient solution to the crisis of the 
day”). 
 236.  The most fundamental purpose of our federalist structure is to protect 
individual liberty, and especially those liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.  
New York, 505 U.S. at 181-82 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison); 
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); 
Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458).  For federalism to protect individual liberty, there must 
be a healthy balance of power between the States and the federal government.  
Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458. 
 237.  It unconstitutionally violates the “very principle of separate state 
sovereignty” for Congress “to compromise the structural framework of dual 
sovereignty . . . .”  Printz, 521 U.S. at 932.  It is equally a violation of that 
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principle for Congress to prohibit state sovereignty from serving its basic 
structural purpose of protecting individual liberty. 
 238.  The letter and spirit of the Constitution thus require our system of 
federalism to protect individual liberty and to prohibit any effort to consolidate 
power in the federal government in such a way that the States are prevented from 
serving this basic structural purpose of protecting individual liberty.  
 239.  The individual, consumer, administrative, employer, health exchange 
and Medicaid eligibility and maintenance of effort mandates of the Act, as well as 
any related penalties and regulatory authority, including the establishment of 
IPAB (hereinafter the “foregoing provisions of the Act”), are not consistent with 
the letter and spirit of the Constitution because they consolidate power in the 
federal government in such a way that the separation of powers is ignored, 
constitutional rights are burdened and the states are prevented from serving the 
basic structural purpose of protecting individual liberty. 
240.  The Act‟s provisions creating IPAB are not consistent with the letter 
and spirit of the Constitution because they bypass the constitutionally prescribed 
manner in which proposed legislation becomes a law, related checks and balances 
between the executive and legislative branches, and the separation of powers 
between those branches, by empowering IPAB to propose and recommend 
legislation that can become law without Congressional action or meaningful 
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Congressional oversight and without being subject to a presidential veto.  See U.S. 
CONST. art. 1, §8. 
 241.  The Act‟s effort to alter by statute the parliamentary rules of each 
House with respect to proposed amendments to IPAB‟s proposals and 
recommendations is not consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution 
because it submitted each House‟s exclusive rulemaking authority under Article 1, 
Section 5, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution to a majority vote of the other House 
and a Presidential veto.  
 242.  The foregoing provisions of the Act are not appropriately or plainly 
adapted to exercising any enumerated power of the federal government. 
 243.  Congress lacks the power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to 
impose the foregoing provisions of the Act. 
 244.  The foregoing provisions of the Act currently burden and will 
continue to burden Plaintiff Coons‟ liberty and privacy interests, as well as his 
quasi-sovereign interest in freely exercising his legislative power of initiative and 
referendum by denying and/or diminishing their otherwise lawful scope and 
effectiveness. 
 245.  The foregoing provisions of the Act injure Plaintiff Coons with 
current and/or threatened economic harm, the inevitability of which is patent.  See, 
e.g., Okpalobi, 190 F.3d at 350. 
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 246.  The foregoing provisions of the Act currently burden and will 
continue to burden State Legislator Plaintiffs and other state legislators‟ liberty 
and quasi-sovereign interests in legislative voting, as well as their state 
constitutional voting duties by contributing to the diminishment of their otherwise 
lawful scope and effectiveness. 
 247.  The foregoing provisions of the Act currently burden and will 
continue to burden Plaintiffs Flake, Franks and Shadegg and other federal 
legislators‟ liberty and quasi-sovereign interests in legislative voting, as well as 
their constitutional voting duties by contributing to the diminishment of their 
otherwise lawful scope and effectiveness. 
 248.  The foregoing provisions of the Act are currently causing actual and 
well-founded worry, fear, and anguish to Plaintiffs. 
Count X 
The Act Violates the Tenth Amendment 
 249.  Plaintiffs reallege, adopt and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 
through 248 above as though fully set forth herein. 
 250.  By expressly reserving powers to the States or the people, the Tenth 
Amendment substantively reinforces the letter and spirit of the Constitution by 
prohibiting any constitutional interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
or any other clause, that could impliedly consolidate all governmental power in 
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the federal government or otherwise render States political non-entities.  Printz, 
521 U.S. at 923-24 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 33 (Alexander Hamilton); Gary 
Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A 
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 Duke L.J. 267, 297-326, 
330-33 (1993)). 
 251.  The Tenth Amendment further confirms that under our Constitution 
the federal government is one of enumerated, and hence limited, powers: “The 
powers delegated by the . . . Constitution to the federal government are few and 
defined.  Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and 
indefinite.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison).    
 252.  The foregoing provisions of the Act violate principles of state 
sovereignty guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment by: 
(A) interfering with Arizona‟s sovereign power to protect individual liberty 
through the Health Care Freedom Public Policy and Health Care Freedom 
Act (upon its enactment); 
 
(B) co-opting control over Arizona‟s budgetary processes and legislative 
agendas; 
 
(C) usurping Arizona‟s exclusive police, taxing and spending authority, 
including the exclusive authority to regulate intrastate, non-economic 
inactivity and to levy direct, unapportioned taxes; 
 
(D) burdening the voting powers of State Legislator Plaintiffs and other 
state legislators; 
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(E) burdening the voting powers of Plaintiff Nick Coons, and other 
Arizonans, under their state constitutional power of initiative and 
referendum; 
 
(F) commandeering officials and departments of the State of Arizona; and, 
  
(G) effectively dissolving the vertical separation of powers between the 
federal and state governments and effectively displacing an area of 
regulation traditionally entrusted to the States‟ police power. 
 
 253.  State officials do not have the constitutional power to surrender 
Arizona‟s sovereignty in the foregoing ways in exchange for federal funds 
because the guarantee of state sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment exists to 
protect the people, as much as it exists to preserve the prerogatives of the State.  
Cf. New York, 505 U.S. at 182 (“[W]here Congress exceeds its authority relative 
to the States . . . the departure cannot be ratified by the „consent‟ of state 
officials”). 
 254.  By attempting to induce Arizona state officials to blindly surrender 
state sovereignty in the foregoing ways in exchange for federal funds, the Act 
wrongfully, coercively, unconscionably and unconstitutionally seeks to induce 
state officials to abandon federalist structures they have no power to abandon. 
 255.  Congress can no more claim the constitutional power to induce 
Arizona to comply with the Act‟s mandates in exchange for federal funding, than 
it could induce Arizona to sell one of its Constitutionally-guaranteed senatorial 
seats in exchange for federal funding. 
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 256.  The power to enact the foregoing provisions of the Act was not 
delegated to Congress under the Constitution.  Consequently, the power to enact 
such legislation, if any, is exclusively reserved to the States or to the people under 
the Tenth Amendment.  
 257.  The foregoing provisions of the Act currently burden and will 
continue to burden Plaintiff Coons‟ liberty and privacy interests, as well as his 
quasi-sovereign interest in freely exercising his legislative power of initiative and 
referendum by denying and/or diminishing their otherwise lawful scope and 
effectiveness. 
 258.  The foregoing provisions of the Act injure Plaintiff Coons with 
current and/or threatened economic harm, the inevitability of which is patent.  See, 
e.g., Okpalobi, 190 F.3d at 350 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 259.  The foregoing provisions of the Act currently burden and will 
continue to burden State Legislator Plaintiffs and other state legislators‟ liberty 
and quasi-sovereign interests in legislative voting, as well as their state 
constitutional voting duties by contributing to the diminishment of their otherwise 
lawful scope and effectiveness. 
 260.  The foregoing provisions of the Act currently burden and will 
continue to burden Plaintiffs Flake, Franks and Shadegg and other legislators‟ 
liberty and quasi-sovereign interests in legislative voting, as well as their 
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constitutional voting duties by contributing to the diminishment of their otherwise 
lawful scope and effectiveness. 
 261.  The foregoing provisions of the Act are currently causing actual and 
well-founded worry, fear, and anguish to Plaintiffs. 
 262.  The foregoing provisions of the Act cause and will continue to cause 
irreparable harm to Plaintiffs by violating the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution.  
Alternative Count XI 
 
Non-Preemption 
 
 263.  Plaintiffs reallege, adopt and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 
through 262 above as though fully set forth herein.  
 264.  The Act does not expressly preempt Arizona‟s laws or constitutional 
provisions, such as the Health Care Freedom Public Policy or the forthcoming 
Health Care Freedom Act. 
 265.  Section 1555 of the Act expressly states: 
No individual, company, business, nonprofit entity, or health 
insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance 
coverage shall be required to participate in any Federal health 
insurance program created under this Act (or any amendments made 
by this Act), or in any Federal health insurance program expanded by 
this Act (or any such amendments), and there shall be no penalty or 
fine imposed upon any such issuer for choosing not to participate in 
such programs. 
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 266.  Accordingly, significant federalism interests would be implicated and 
serious concerns about the Act‟s constitutionality would arise, if the Act‟s 
individual, employer and health exchange mandates, and related penalties and 
regulations, were construed as preempting the Health Care Freedom Public Policy 
and the Health Care Freedom Act (if enacted). 
 267.  In the alternative to the allegations supporting the constitutional 
causes of action advanced in the preceding paragraphs, the Act does not clearly, 
directly and unequivocally override state laws or constitutional provisions, such as 
the Health Care Freedom Public Policy or the forthcoming Health Care Freedom 
Act. 
 268.  In the alternative to the allegations supporting the constitutional 
causes of action advanced in the preceding paragraphs, the Act should not be 
construed as preempting the Health Care Freedom Public Policy or the Health 
Care Freedom Act (upon its enactment). 
 269.   In the alternative to the allegations supporting the constitutional 
causes of action advanced in the preceding paragraphs, the Act should be 
construed as deferring to the Health Care Freedom Public Policy or the  Health 
Care Freedom Act (upon its enactment), as legitimate exercises of the State of 
Arizona‟s exclusive Tenth Amendment police, taxing and spending authority in 
accordance with the structural purpose of the American system of federalism, 
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which requires the preservation of individual liberty by diffusing the concentration 
of power. 
 270.  The individual, consumer, administrative, employer and health 
exchange mandates, and related penalties and regulations, including the 
recommendations and proposals of IPAB, should be regarded as unenforceable as 
applied within the boundaries of the State of Arizona to the extent they interfere 
with the freedom protected by the Health Care Freedom Public Policy and the 
Health Care Freedom Act (upon its enactment). 
REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
 271.  For all of the foregoing reasons, Defendants are without lawful 
authority and/or are acting in violation of the United States Constitution by 
enforcing and threatening to continue to enforce the individual, consumer, 
administrative, employer, health exchange and Medicaid eligibility and 
maintenance of effort mandates of the Act, as well as any related penalties and 
regulatory authority, including the establishment, recommendations and proposals 
of IPAB. 
 272.  Plaintiffs have no adequate legal, administrative, or other remedy by 
which to prevent or minimize the continuing and/or threatened irreparable harm 
from Defendants‟ current and threatened enforcement of the foregoing provisions 
of the Act. 
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 273.  An actual live controversy exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants, 
in which the parties have genuine and opposing interests, interests that are direct 
and substantial, and of which a judicial determination will be final and conclusive. 
 274.  Plaintiffs have a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. 
 275.  The public interest and equities favor entry of a court order granting 
Plaintiffs the following described declaratory relief, as well as temporary, 
preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court: 
 A. Declare the Act to be in violation of the United States Constitution both 
facially and as applied to Plaintiffs and others similarly situated; or, alternatively, 
declare that the Act does not preempt the Health Care Freedom Public Policy or 
the forthcoming Health Care Freedom Act, and the Act‟s individual, consumer, 
administrative employer and health exchange mandates, and related penalties and 
regulations, including the establishment, recommendations and proposals of 
IPAB, are not enforceable within the boundaries of the State of Arizona. 
 B. Declare Defendants are acting in violation of the Constitution by 
enforcing and threatening to continue to enforce the Act against Plaintiffs and 
others similarly situated; or, alternatively, declaring Defendants are acting 
unlawfully by enforcing and threatening to continue to enforce the Act‟s 
individual, consumer, employer and health exchange mandates, and related 
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penalties and regulations, including the establishment, recommendations and 
proposals of IPAB, within the boundaries of the State of Arizona; 
 C. Enjoin Defendants and any other agency or employee acting on behalf of 
the United States from enforcing the Act against Plaintiffs, and others similarly 
situated; or, alternatively, enjoining Defendants and any other agency or employee 
acting on behalf of the United States from enforcing the Act‟s individual, 
consumer, employer and health exchange mandates, and related penalties and 
regulations, including the establishment, recommendations and proposals of 
IPAB, within the boundaries of the State of Arizona; and 
 D. Award Plaintiffs their reasonable attorneys‟ fees, litigation expenses and 
costs, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and other applicable 
law, and grant such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.  
August 12, 2010   
       RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
 
      s/ Clint Bolick  
      Clint Bolick (Ariz. Bar No. 021684) 
      Diane S. Cohen (Ariz. Bar No. 027791) 
      Nicholas C. Dranias (Ariz. Bar No. 330033) 
      Gustavo E. Schneider (Ariz. Bar No. 027213) 
       GOLDWATER INSTITUTE 
      500 E. Coronado Rd., Phoenix, AZ 85004 
      P: (602) 462-5000 / F: (602) 256-7045 
      CBolick@GoldwaterInstitute.org 
      DCohen@GoldwaterInstitute.org 
      NDranias@GoldwaterInstitute.org 
      GSchneider@GoldwaterInstitute.org 
      Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
